AVC EDGE AND VERIVOTE

Sequoia Voting Systems WinEDS Version 3.0.134, AVC Edge Version 4.3.320, Card Activator v. 4.3.320 and VeriVote

Administrative Review and Analysis

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I. **SUMMARY OF THE APPLICATION**

Procedures, hardware, firmware and software developed by Sequoia Voting Systems for use with WinEDS v. 3.0.134, the AVC Edge v. 4.3.3.07, the Card Activator v. 4.3.320 and the VeriVote.

II. **SUMMARY OF THE SYSTEM**

This proposed system would be a modification to the AVC Edge Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting system as currently used and configured in California. The proposed system consists of two different configurations. One configuration supports a voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) using the VeriVote while the other does not. The application consists of four voting system components.

1. **WinEDS v. 3.0.134**

WinEDS is an Election Management System software package. Before an election, WinEDS is used by a jurisdiction to create the ballot definition for an election. WinEDS is then used to program the other voting system components. After the election, WinEDS is then used to compile and tabulate election returns from throughout the jurisdiction. Finally WinEDS contains a series of reporting functions.

Version 3.0.134 has been previously certified. There are several previously identified issues relating to WinEDS version 3.0.134 that therefore remain. Specifically, WinEDS is not capable of generating reports with all the required information for a California primary. An additional program is required to meet this requirement.

2. **AVC Edge 4.3.320**

The AVC Edge is a self-contained touchscreen voting device. The basic operation of the device is unchanged from the previously certified version. The voter activates the system by inserting a voter access card (a credit card sized device) into a built in smart card reader. The voter then makes his/her selections using the touchscreen. Units designed to be accessible to the blind or visually impaired also include a keypad and audio functionality to lead the voter through the selection and ballot casting procedures.

The unit also includes removable flash memory cards. The flash memory cards are used both to load ballot definitions onto the device and to store election returns for later return to the central tabulation center.
The unit may also include a built in roll-based printer. The printer is designed to print reports and audit logs during the opening and closing of the polls. The printer is not designed to provide a voter-verified paper audit trail.

The application does not include any modifications to the hardware of the AVC Edge. The application is for a modification from the previously certified version of the firmware (version 4.2a) to version 4.3.320. The significant changes between version 4.2a and version 4.3.320 consist of the following:

1. Added functionality to support for the VeriVote VVPAT system
2. Added functionality to add to provisional voter ID to the voted smart cards
3. Added functionality allowing poll workers to specify audio voting when activating the smart card.
4. Added functionality relating to the display of undevotes in vote for more than one contests
5. Added functionality related to the printing of multiple results reports
6. Correction to an anomaly related to the internal clock.

3. Card Activator v. 4.3.320

The third component of the application is the Card Activator v. 4.3.320. The Card Activator is used by the poll workers to activate voter access cards that the voter uses to activate the AVC Edge to display the voter’s correct ballot style. A poll worker would insert a voter access card into the Card Activator in order to program and activate it prior to giving it to a voter.

The significant change between the previously certified version (4.32) and v. 4.3.320 is the aforementioned added functionality allowing the poll worker to specify audio voting when activating the smart card.

4. VeriVote

The fourth component of the application is the VeriVote VVPAT system. The VeriVote uses a continuous roll of paper. The VeriVote is mounted on the side of the AVC Edge.

When using the VeriVote, upon completing reviewing their ballot on the DRE, a printed paper record is then produced. The voter is able to view the paper record under Plexiglas. They can then accept or reject the record. If they reject the record, the record is visibly spoiled and the voter can change their vote on the DRE. If they accept the record it is then fed up and stored.

The VeriVote currently only supports English and Spanish ballots. Therefore, the application for that configuration is limited to those languages.
The VeriVote is a new piece of equipment not previously certified for use. The
VeriVote is a piece of hardware and does not have a firmware version associated
with it.

III. TESTING INFORMATION AND RESULTS

1. Federal Testing

The NASED # N-1-07-12-11-005 dated October 20, 2004 has been issued date for this
system. However, final reports have not been received by the Secretary of State’s office
and a NASED # has not been issued.

Concerns were raised on the federal level about the fact that the VeriVote is based on a
continuous roll and therefore keeps the votes in sequential order. In response to these
concerns, Sequoia was required to remove information identifying the particular machine
that the paper record from the VVPAT came from. This caused a change in the firmware
version number from 4.3.307 (the version the state tested) to 4.3.320 (the version
federally qualified). This change was reviewed by the ITAs and does not require
additional state testing.

In addition, staff believes that the final ITA reports will note this sequential vote issue
and advise states that they should consider it as part of their certification process.

2. State Testing by the Secretary of State and Consultant.

The system was tested in Sacramento, California from September 28, 2004 to October 1,
2004 by Secretary of State staff in conjunction with the state’s technical expert, Mr. Steve
Freeman.

Testing on the AVC Edge v. 4.3.307 and Card Activator v. 4.3.307 used in conjunction
with WinEDS v. 3.0.134 was completed successfully. Note that this is a different version
than that approved by NASED (3.0.320). Staff has concluded this change does not
require additional state testing.

However, state testing of the VeriVote found several places where the system failed to
meet California’s Accessible Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (AVVPAT) standards.
1. Section 2.4.3.1.2 requires that “The data relayed to the audio device must
come either directly from the data sent to the printer or directly from the paper
record copy.” However, the audio stream used by the AVC Edge with the
VeriVote comes directly from the DRE and is the same data stream used
during the rest of the audio voting. Therefore, under this configuration, voters
using the audio function would still be dependant on federal, state and local
testing to verify whether their vote was recorded accurately.
2. Section 2.3.4.2 requires that “The paper record copy shall be printed in
English and in the language the voter used to cast their vote on the DRE.”
The proposed system prints the paper record only in the language the voter uses to cast their ballot on the AVC Edge. Therefore, for a Spanish language ballot, the paper record copy is printed only in Spanish.

3. Section 2.4.2 requires that “The voter shall have the ability to view both the review screen on the DRE and the paper record copy in the display unit simultaneously.” The proposed system lets the voter view the review screen on the AVC Edge. After accepting those selections and choosing to start printing their paper record, the review screen then disappears. The voter can then verify against the paper record. However, the review screen on the AVC Edge is not visible at that time.

The vendor has raised objections to staff’s application of the standards in all three of these cases.

IV. COMPLIANCE WITH STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS

The Secretary of State of California has developed and promulgated a procedure for approving, certifying, reviewing, modifying, and decertifying voting systems, vote tabulating systems, election observer panel plans, and auxiliary equipment, materials and procedures.

Four sections of this procedure, Sections 103, 104, 504, and 601, describe in detail the requirements any voting system must meet in order to be approved for use in California elections. These sections will be described in detail and the system will be analyzed for compliance in this Administrative Review and Analysis of the system.

1. §103 (a) (1): The machine or device and its software shall be suitable for the purpose for which it is intended.

The non-VeriVote configuration meets this requirement with the exception of being able to produce reports with all the required data for a California primary as discussed in Section II of this report. The VeriVote configuration does not meet this requirement for the reasons discussed in Section III.

2. §103 (a) (2): The system shall preserve the secrecy of the ballot.

The non-VeriVote configuration meets this requirement. The VeriVote configuration meets the state standards as long as there is more than one AVC Edge with a VeriVote in the precinct. See Section III regarding the federal standards relating to this item.

3. §103 (a) (3): The system shall be safe from fraud or manipulation.
The non-VeriVote configuration is at least as secure as the currently certified version. The VeriVote configuration adds a VVPAT.

4. §103 (a) (4): The system shall be auditable for the purposes of an election recount or contest procedure.

The non-VeriVote configuration meets current requirements relating to audits for the purposes of an election recount or contest procedures. The system does not include an AVVPAT as required in jurisdictions where the system was not used in the March 2004 primary election and in all jurisdictions beginning January 1, 2006.

The VeriVote configuration adds a VVPAT as well as procedures for the use of the paper record in a recount.

§103 (a) (5): The system shall comply with all appropriate federal and California laws and regulations.

The non-VeriVote configuration meets this requirement with the exception of being able to produce reports with all the required data for a California primary as discussed in Section II of this report. The VeriVote configuration does not meet the California AVVPAT standards.

6. §103 (a) (6): The system shall have been certified, if applicable, by means of qualification testing by a Nationally Recognized Test Laboratory (NRTL) and shall meet or exceed the minimum requirements set forth in the Performance and Test Standards for Punch Card, Mark Sense, and Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems, or in any successor voluntary standard document, developed and promulgated by the Federal Election Commission.

The system has not yet received a federal qualification number.

7. §103 (b): In addition to the requirements of subdivision (a) of this section, voting systems, procedures, and equipment approved and certified by the Secretary of State shall promote accessible voting opportunities for persons with physical disabilities.

The non-VeriVote configuration is more accessible than the currently certified system due to the added functionality related to the activation of the audio ballot using the smart card. The VeriVote configuration does not meet the state AVVPAT standards as related to accessibility.

8. §104 (a): Certification consists of three separate levels of testing: qualification, certification and acceptance.

Federal qualification status is pending.
A technical consultant to the Secretary of State performed state certification testing.

Acceptance testing will be conducted by the county elections official once a county takes receipt of the modifications.

9. §104 (b): Certification tests shall include functional tests and qualitative assessment to ensure that the system operates in a manner that is acceptable under federal and state law and regulations.

It is the opinion of the expert technical consultant that the scope of the certification test was adequate to make basic recommendations and observations about the logical accuracy, some user friendliness issues, and compliance with state law.

10. §104 (c): Certification tests shall enhance public confidence by assuring that the system protects the secrecy of the ballot and the security of the voting process, and records and counts votes accurately.

The non-VeriVote configuration is at least as secure as the currently certified version. The VeriVote configuration adds a VVPAT.

11. §104 (d): Certification tests shall promote public confidence that the system is easy to use or ‘voter friendly.’

The proposed system is not any less voter friendly than the currently certified system.

12. §104 (e): Certification testing shall demonstrate that the system creates an audit trail showing both that the voter was able to vote for the candidate or for or against a measure of his or her choice and that the system correctly and consistently interpreted the voter’s votes.

The system meets this requirement. The VeriVote adds a VVPAT.

13. §504: The Evaluation shall include a review of California Elections Code sections, which address the application.

A review of the appropriate Elections Code sections was conducted.

§15360. During the official canvass of every election in which a voting system is used, the official conducting the election shall conduct a public manual tally of the ballots tabulated by those devices cast in 1 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official. If 1 percent of the precincts should be less than one whole precinct, the tally shall be conducted in one precinct chosen at random by the elections official.
In addition to the 1 percent count, the elections official shall, for each race not included in the initial group of precincts, count one additional precinct. The manual tally shall apply only to the race not previously counted.

The system meets this requirement.

§19300 permit the voter to vote for all the candidates of one party or in part for the candidates of one party and in part for the candidates of one or more other parties.

The system meets this requirement.

§19301. A voting machine shall provide in the general election for grouping under the name of the office to be voted on, all the candidates for the office with the designation of the parties, if any, by which they were respectively nominated.

The designation may be by usual or reasonable abbreviation of party names.

The system meets this requirement.

§19302. The labels on voting machines and the way in which candidates’ names are grouped shall conform as nearly as possible to the form of ballot provided for in elections where voting machines are not used.

The system meets this requirement.

§19303. If the voting machine is so constructed that a voter can cast a vote in part for presidential electors of one party and in part for those of one or more other parties or those not nominated by any party, it may also be provided with: (a) one device for each party for voting for all the presidential electors of that party by one operation, (b) a ballot label therefore containing only the words “presidential electors” preceded by the name of the party and followed by the names of its candidates for the offices of President and Vice President, and (c) a registering device therefore which shall register the vote cast for the electors when thus voted collectively.

If a voting machine is so constructed that a voter can cast a vote in part for delegates to a national party convention of one party and in part for those of one or more other parties or those not nominated by any party, it may be provided with one device for each party for voting by one operation for each group of candidates to national conventions that may be voted for as a group according to the law governing presidential primaries.
No straight party voting device shall be used except for delegates to a national convention or for presidential electors.

The system complies with these requirements.

§19304. A write-in ballot shall be cast in its appropriate place on the machine, or it shall be void and not counted.

The system allows for write-in votes to be resolved through a manual process. The built-in write-in resolution process should not be used. The modification does correct for an error message that was displayed in previous versions that prevented a Decline to State voter from writing-in a candidate in more than one contest while casting a ballot in another party’s primary (crossover).

§19320. Before preparing a voting machine for any general election, the elections official shall mail written notice to the chairperson of the county central committee of at least two of the principal political parties, stating the time and place where machines will be prepared. At the specified time, one representative of each of the political parties shall be afforded an opportunity to see that the machines are in proper condition for use in the election.

The party representatives shall be sworn to perform faithfully their duties but shall not interfere with the officials or assume any of their duties. When a machine has been so examined by the representatives, it shall be sealed with a numbered metal seal. The representatives shall certify to the number of the machines, whether all of the counters are set at zero (000), and the number registered on the protective counter and on the seal.

The system meets this requirement.

§19321. The elections official shall affix ballot labels to the machines to correspond with the sample ballot for the election. He or she shall employ competent persons to assist him or her in affixing the labels and in putting the machines in order. Each machine shall be tested to ascertain whether it is operating properly.

The system meets this requirement.

§19322. When a voting machine has been properly prepared for an election, it shall be locked against voting and sealed. After that initial preparation, a member of the precinct board or some duly authorized person, other than the one preparing the machines, shall inspect each machine and submit a written report. The report shall note the following: (1) Whether all of the registering counters are set at zero
(000), (2) whether the machine is arranged in all respects in good order for the election, (3) whether the machine is locked, (4) the number on the protective counter, (5) the number on the seal. The keys shall be delivered to the election board together with a copy of the written report, made on the proper blanks, stating that the machine is in every way properly prepared for the election.

The system meets this requirement.

§19340. Any member of a precinct board who has not previously attended a training class in the use of the voting machines and the duties of a board member shall be required to do so, unless appointed to fill an emergency vacancy.

The system meets this requirement.

§19341. The precinct board shall consist of one inspector and two judges who shall be appointed and compensated pursuant to the general election laws. One additional inspector or judge shall be appointed for each additional voting machine used in the polling place.

The system meets this requirement.

§19360. Before unsealing the envelope containing the keys and opening the doors concealing the counters the precinct board shall determine that the number on the seal on the machine and the number registered on the protective counter correspond to the numbers on the envelope.

Each member of the precinct board shall then carefully examine the counters to see that each registers zero (000). If the machine is provided with embossing, printing, or photography devices that record the readings of the counters the board shall, instead of opening the counter compartment, cause a “before election proof sheet” to be produced and determined by it that all counters register zero (000).

If any discrepancy is found in the numbers registered on the counters or the “before election proof sheet” the precinct board shall make, sign, and post a written statement attesting to this fact. In filling out the statement of return of votes cast, the precinct board shall subtract any number shown on the counter from the number shown on the counter at the close of the polls.

The system meets this requirement.
§19361. The keys to the voting machines shall be delivered to the precinct board no later than 12 hours before the opening of the polls. They shall be in an envelope upon which is written the designation and location of the election precinct, the number of the voting machine, the number on the seal, and the number registered on the protective counter. The precinct board member receiving the key shall sign a receipt.

The envelope shall not be opened until at least two members of the precinct board are present to determine that the envelope has not been opened.

At the close of the polls the keys shall be placed in the envelope supplied by the official and the number of the machine, the number written on the envelope.

The system meets this requirement.

§19362. The exterior of the voting machine and every part of the polling place shall be in plain view of the election precinct board and the poll watchers.

Each machine shall be at least four feet from the poll clerk’s table.

The system meets this requirement.

§19363. Voters shall not remain in or occupy the booths or compartments longer than is necessary to mark their ballots, which shall not exceed five minutes. However, where no other voter would be inconvenienced, a longer period shall be allowed.

The system meets this requirement.

§19370. As soon as the polls are closed, the precinct board, in the presence of the watchers and all others lawfully present, shall immediately lock the voting machine against voting and open the counting compartments, giving full view of all counter numbers. A board member shall in the order of the offices as their titles are arranged on the machine, read and distinctly announce the name or designating number and letter on each counter for each candidate’s name and the result as shown by the counter numbers. He or she shall also in the same manner announce the vote on each measure.

If the machine is provided with a recording device, in lieu of opening the counter compartment the precinct board shall proceed to operate the mechanism to produce the statement of return of votes cast record in a minimum of three copies, remove the irregular ballot, if any, record on the statement of return of votes cast record. The irregular ballot shall, be
attached to the statement of result record of votes cast for the machine and become a part thereof. One copy of the statement of return of votes cast for each machine shall be posted upon the outside wall of the precinct for all to see. The statement of return of votes cast for each machine for the precinct shall constitute the precinct statement of result of votes cast.

The system meets this requirement.

§19371. Before adjourning, the precinct board shall seal the operating lever with the seal provided and lock the machine so that the voting and counting mechanism may not be operated.

It shall remain locked and sealed against operation until the time for filing a contest of election has expired, which shall not exceed a period of 30 days following the declaration of the result of the election by the body canvassing the returns.

Does not apply.

§19380. During the reading of the result of votes cast, any candidate or watcher who may desire to be present shall be admitted to the polling place. The proclamation of the result of the votes cast shall be distinctly announced by the precinct board who shall read the name of each candidate, or the designating number and letter of his or her counter, and the vote registered on the counter. The board shall also read the vote cast for and against each measure submitted. The board shall not count votes cast for write-in candidates, but shall have these counted by the elections official. During the proclamation, many opportunities shall be given to any person lawfully present to compare the result so announced with the counter dials of the machine, and any necessary corrections shall immediately be made by the precinct board, after which the doors of the voting machine shall be closed and locked.

If the machine is provided with a recording device, the alternate procedures in Section 19370 may be used.

The system meets this requirement.

§19381. In each election district where voting machines are used, statements of the results of the vote cast shall be printed to conform with the type of voting machine used.

The designating number and letter on the counter for each candidate shall be printed next to the candidate's name on the statements of result of the vote cast. Two such statements shall be used in each election district.

The system meets this requirement.
§19382. The statement of the result of votes cast, which shall be certified by the precinct board, shall contain:
(a) The total number of votes cast.
(b) The number of votes cast for each candidate and measure as shown on the counter.
(c) The number of votes for persons not nominated.
(d) Printed directions to the precinct board for their guidance before the polls are opened and when the polls are closed.
(e) A certificate, which shall be signed by the election officers before the polls are opened, showing:
   (1) The delivery of the keys in a sealed envelope.
   (2) The number on the seal.
   (3) The number registered on the protective counter.
   (4) Whether all of the counters are set at zero (000).
   (5) Whether the public counter is set at zero (000).
   (6) Whether the ballot labels are properly placed in the machine.
(f) A certificate that shall be filled out after the polls have been closed, showing:
   (1) That the machine has been locked against voting and sealed.
   (2) The number of voters as shown on the public counter.
   (3) The number on the seal.
   (4) The number registered on the protective counter.
   (5) That the voting machine is closed and locked.

The reports generated by the AVC Edge and the procedures submitted comply with this requirement.

§19383. A member of the precinct board shall enter the vote, as registered, on the statements of result of votes cast, in the same order on the space that has the same name or designating number and letter, after which another member shall verify the figures by calling them off in the same manner from the counters of the machine.

The counter compartment of the voting machine shall remain open until the official returns and all other reports have been fully completed and verified by the precinct board.

If the machine is provided with a recording device, the alternate procedures in Section 19370 may be used.

The system meets this requirement.

§19384. The precinct board shall, before it adjourns, post conspicuously on the outside of the polling place a copy of the result of the votes cast at the polling place. The copy of the result shall be signed by the members of the precinct board.
If the machine is provided with a recording device, the statement of result of vote’s cast produced by operating its mechanism may be considered the “result of the votes cast” at the polling place.

The system meets this requirement.

§19385. The precinct board shall immediately transmit unsealed to the elections official a copy of the result of the votes cast at the polling place, the copy shall be signed by the members of the precinct board, and shall be open to public inspection.

The system meets this requirement.

§19386. Before proceeding to canvass the returns of an election at which voting machines have been used to register the votes cast, the board authorized to canvass returns shall open the counter compartment and compare the records of votes cast for the several candidates voted for and for and against the several measures voted upon shown on each machine with those recorded on the statement of results of votes cast prepared from that machine by the precinct board. Any errors found on the statement shall be corrected by crossing out the recorded incorrect number, and recording the correct number nearby.

The system meets this requirement.

14. §504 (b): A review of federal statutes or regulations, which address the application.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended (42 U.S.C. 1973), requires all elections in certain covered jurisdictions to provide registration and voting materials and oral assistance in the language of a qualified language minority group in addition to English. Currently in California, there are six VRA languages (Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese Korean and Tagalog) as prescribed under the law.

The non-VeriVote configuration can displayed information on the DRE in additional languages as required by the jurisdiction for all required languages. The VeriVote configuration can only support English and Spanish. Further, the VeriVote configuration does not meet the California AVVPAT standards.

The system allows for the casting of fail-safe or provisional ballots on the AVC Edge. The system procedures also allow for the casting of provisional ballots through the use of specially marked envelopes using the previously certified Optech 400C voting system. The WinEDS software allows for the tabulation of only the portions of a provisional ballot the voter is deemed to have eligibility to vote in as required by California law.

However, the WinEDS software does not allow for the tabulation of only the portions of a provisional ballot the voter is deemed to have eligibility to vote in as required by California law for votes involving a split precinct. These ballots can still be resolved by manually recreating the ballot.

The Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 1973ee through 1973ee-6) requires each political subdivision conducting elections within each state to assure that all polling places for federal elections are accessible to elderly and handicapped voters, except in the case of an emergency as determined by the state’s chief election officer or unless the state’s chief election officer: (1) determines, by surveying all potential polling places, that no such place in the area is accessible or can be made temporarily accessible, and (2) assures that any handicapped voter assigned to an inaccessible polling place will, upon advance request under established state procedures, either be assigned to an accessible polling place or be provided an alternative means of casting a ballot on election day.

The non-VeriVote configuration is more accessible than the currently certified system due to the added functionality related to the activation of the audio ballot using the smart card. The VeriVote configuration does not meet the state AVVPAT standards as related to accessibility.

The Retention of Voting Documentation (42 U.S.C. 1974 through 1974e) statute applies in all jurisdictions and to all elections in which a federal candidate is on a ballot. It requires elections officials to preserve for 22 months all records and papers which came into their possession relating to an application, registration, payment of a poll tax, or other act requisite to voting. Note: The US Department of Justice considers this law to cover all voter registration records, all poll lists and similar documents reflecting the identity of voters casting ballots at the polls, all applications for absentee ballots, all envelopes in which absentee ballots are returned for tabulation, all documents containing oaths of voters, all documents relating to challenges to voters or absentee ballots, all tally sheets and canvass reports, all records reflecting the appointment of persons entitled to act as poll officials or poll watchers, and all computer programs used to tabulate votes electronically. In addition, it is the Department of Justice’s view that the phrase “other act requisite to voting” requires the retention of the ballots themselves, at least in those jurisdictions where a voter’s electoral preference is manifested by marking a piece of paper or by punching holes in a computer card.

The system allows for the retention of the electronic record of the ballots as well as the paper record produced by the VeriVote.
15. §504 (c): A copy of the approved Qualification Test results released directly to the Secretary of State by a Nationally Recognized Test Laboratory (NRTL).

Qualification test reports are still pending from the federal Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs).

16. §504 (d): A review, if applicable, of transcripts or other materials from prior meetings or hearings on the proposed system, procedure, or modification, either in whole or in part.

The relevant documentation has been reviewed.

17. §504 (e): A review, if applicable, of any procedures manuals, guidelines or other materials adopted for use with the system addressed by the application.

The procedures for use with this system have been reviewed.

18. §504 (f): A review of any effect the application will have on the security of the election system.

The non-VeriVote configuration is at least as secure as the currently certified version. The VeriVote configuration adds a VVPAT.

19. §504 (g): A review of any effect the application will have on the accuracy of the election system.

The system was tested by federal and state testers and deemed to record votes accurately.

20. §504 (h): A review of any effect the application will have on the ease and convenience with which voters use the system.

The proposed system is not any less voter friendly than the currently certified system.

21. §504 (i): A review of any effect the application will have on the timeliness of vote reporting.

The proposed system will not delay the reporting of election results relative to the currently certified system.

22. §504 (j): A review of any effect the application will have on the overall efficiency of the election system.

The proposed system is at least as efficient as the currently certified voting system.

23. §504 (k): A Description of Deposit Materials showing that the Ballot Tally Software Source Code has been deposited in Escrow with an Escrow Company
approved pursuant to Chapter 6, Division 7, Title 2 of the California Administrative Code, beginning with Section 20630.

Proof of Escrow documents has been received by the Secretary of State’s office.

24. §601: The Secretary of State shall not approve a proposed item without a finding that the item conforms to all applicable laws, procedures and regulations, including the right to a secret ballot, does not compromise the accuracy, security or integrity of the election process, nor interferes with the voter’s ease and convenience in voting.

The proposed system is at least as effective in maintaining the secrecy of the ballot, the accuracy, security and integrity of the elections process, and voter ease and convenience.

V. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Accessible Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail Standards

The non-VeriVote configuration does not include an Accessible Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (AVVPAT). Therefore, under the June 15, 2004 AVVPAT standards and the April 30, 2004 decertification directive, the proposed AccuVote-TS system can only be used in jurisdictions that used the system in the March 2004 election. Further, the proposed system, without a modification to include an AVVPAT, can only be used through January 1, 2006 in those jurisdictions.

The VeriVote configuration has been compared to the AVVPAT standards. Section III notes several points of conflict with those standards. The technical consultant’s report contains a more detailed analysis of those issues.


The Secretary of State has imposed a series of additional security requirements for the use of DRE voting systems not including an AVVPAT.

VI. PUBLIC COMMENT

In response to the public meeting notice being issued and allowing for written submissions, we have received no correspondences specific to this application.
VII. RECOMMENDATION

Staff recommends the certification of the Sequoia Voting Systems WinEDS 3.0.134, AVC Edge 4.3.320 and Card Activator 4.3.320 with the following conditions:

1. The vendor must submit final reports from the federal Independent Testing Authorities for all system components by October 27, 2004.
2. No additional software developed by the Vendor, including but not limited to Report Viewer, other than that specifically listed in this certification shall be installed on a computer running WinEDS Version 3.0.134.
3. WinEDS Version 3.0.134 shall not be used in a California statewide direct primary election.
4. The write-in resolution function in WinEDS Version 3.0.134 shall not be used.
5. No substitution or modification of the voting systems shall be made with respect to any component of the voting systems, including the Procedures, until the Secretary of State has been notified in writing and has determined that the proposed change or modification does not impair the accuracy and efficiency of the voting systems sufficient to require a re-examination and approval.
6. The Voting System can be used only if the requestor complies with the security measures that apply to it that are contained in the directive of the Secretary of State dated April 30, 2004, entitled Decertification and Withdrawal of Approval of Certain DRE Voting Systems and Conditional Approval of the Use of Certain DRE Voting Systems, as further clarified by the Secretary of State’s memorandum dated May 14, 2004, and any other agreement between the vendor and the Secretary of State.
7. The AVC Edge shall only be used in the Counties of Napa, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa Clara, Shasta and Tehama and only if the county using the AVC Edge complies with the security measures that apply to the county as contained in the directive of the Secretary of State dated April 30, 2004, entitled Decertification and Withdrawal of Approval of Certain DRE Voting Systems and Conditional Approval of the Use of Certain DRE Voting Systems, as further clarified by the Secretary of State’s memorandum dated May 14, 2004, and any other agreement between the county and the Secretary of State.
8. The Voting System shall not be used after January 1, 2006, or such earlier date as provided for by statute, unless it is modified to include an accessible, voter-verified paper audit trail and is approved or certified for use by the Secretary of State with such a feature.
9. The Secretary of State reserves the right, with reasonable notice to Vendor and to the counties using any of the voting systems, to modify the Procedures used with any of the voting systems and to impose additional requirements with respect to the use of any of the systems if the Secretary of State determines that such modifications or additions are necessary to enhance the accuracy, reliability or security of any of the voting systems. Such
modifications or additions shall be deemed to be incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

10. Any county using any voting system shall, prior to such use, file with the California Secretary of State a copy of its Election Observer Panel plan.

Staff does not recommend the certification of the VeriVote VVPAT system.