To: Honorable Secretary of State Debra Bowen
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Re: Comments regarding the Top-to-Bottom Review of InkaVote Plus Precinct Ballot Counter Voting System, version 2.1. the Red Team report of Oct. 27, 2007

Dear Secretary of State Bowen,

I implore you to not certify the InkaVotePlus PBC for the following issues and questions that it raises for the integrity of our elections. All quotes were taken from the Red Te:

1. My experience using the InkaVote Plus in the 2006 November election.
I was a pollworker in LA County. Early in the day, the InkaVotePlus jammed, refusing to accept ballots. The phone number to call for "repairs" was not an official county phone number. After over 2 hours, with the 1st machine sitting unused but with votes recorded into it, a man identifying himself as the election supervisor arrived, and wheeled out the 1st InkaVotePlus machine. He replaced it with another and left with the old one -- with all of the data contained within. The new one malfunctioned almost immediately. Again, the repairline was called. Several hours later, the same election supervisor appeared and wheeled out the second machine, replacing it with a 3rd. The 3rd one seemed tenuous, but the pollworker captain fixed it. I have no idea as to the fate of the machines that were wheeled out -- were they fixed and going to be used in the future? What became of the data within? Is there a way for citizens to see the record of machines that malfunction in an election and insure that they pass inspection if ever intended for use once again? Is the company fined or charged for malfunctioning gear? How do we recoup lost votes contained within. We were told that the inkavoteplus WAS tabulating votes that day.

A total of "1" visually impaired voter came to the polling place and immediately asked the pollworker captain to help her vote. She felt more comfortable getting help from a pollworker than trying to use the rickety Inkavote plus ada equipment.

2. Despite the preponderance of evidence available to the general public, the RR/CC of LA County and staff members, including newest hiree, Dean Logan, continue to embrace the idea of DREs, and optical scanners despite documentation of numerous problems and the fact that we cannot be assured of elections being transparent and accurate with their use.

Conny McCormack has testified at Senate Hearings and given public lectures in which she praises voter satisfaction with touchscreen voting. A diligent and public servant with integrity should seek well-researched information before squandering millions of dollars of taxpayer money.

3. Why did ES&S delay submitting Inkavoteplus for the Red Team inspection? Were they penalized for this? Are we as taxpayers entitled to an explanation and/or remedy for this behavior?

4. Why does the LA County RR/CC continue to use ES&S products with the product being bad and the company having bad behavior? Is there any recourse for the taxpayer? Why does the RR/CC sit and wait for equipment to be recertified when computer experts claim that computers cannot be made secure and transparent for elections?

5. Why are we using equipment that cannot be easily understood by citizens? For example, the language in the red team report has sentences such as the following:

"The County of Los Angeles processes to generate the XML were outside the scope of testing. "

I don't understand this jargon. Transparent elections mean that voters should be able to understand every aspect of voting process without having to have a graduate degree in computer science.

and

"Making a change to the BIOS to reconfigure the boot sequence allows the system to be booted up using external memory devices containing a bootable Linux copy (Ref A.11 in

the Summary Table)."

Not immediately understood language!!

Not only is the vote counting unobservable, the equipment is difficult to handle and not easily understood. A cardboard ballot box that is taped shut is easy to observe and understand. Handcounting x's on paper by the sort and stack method is easily understood by people of all levels of education and intelligence.

6. " PBC unit is capable of tallying the ballots and producing a machine report of the results when the polls close, the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles only use the system for the audio ballot and error checking functions without using the ballot tally and reporting functions. The InkaVote ballots are tallied and reports generated by a central counting system used for all the ballots, including both the polling place and absented ballots."

"The Unisyn EMS suite of applications is a set of Java based software applications which allows the user to create election definitions for the PBC, load the election definition into one or more PBCs (multiple units may be programmed using an Ethernet link)"

It is impossible to tell for sure whether the modem is on or not, and whether the device is being accessed from a remote location. Big security breach. Having a modem much less a computer is inappropriate for meeting the election code provision for public observation of votes being counted, or even checking for over/undervote.

7. Red Team Didn't even test tabulation vulnerabilities:
"Accordingly, the examiners were asked to limit their examination, where possible, to the modules of the system which are being used by the County and City of Los Angeles and to vulnerabilities that effect: "

"-the integrity of the election definition needed to support the error detecting and Audio Ballot functions,
• security audit logs and the log reporting services, and
• the basic operation of the PBC (i.e. denial of service attacks).: "

However, in the Nov. 2006 election, we pollworkers were told that the inkavoteplus WAS tabulating -- it tabulates everytime a ballot is deposited. This is like having the votes counted WHILE the polls are OPEN - a clear violation of election code.

8. "Poll worker: Usually has a low knowledge of the voting machine design and configuration. Some may have more advanced knowledge. May carry out attacks designed by others. They have access to the machine for less than one day."

Not True - Poll officershad inkavoteplus PBC's in their possession for approx. 1 WK prior to election day.

9. "Several of the observed vulnerabilities may be ameliorated by such practices (for example, the public observers in the polling place watching the poll workers) but the review and analysis of those practices were out of context for this review."

You can't observe what info. is being transmitted thru modem, could be coming from outside polling place -- would not want to create false security by stating that something can be ameliorated whtn you haven't tested the devices for every possible vulnerability.

10. "Although the transfer of results was not included in the limited scope of this study, the port and Transport Device were considered as potential access points in the examination." This is a huge vulnerability and inappropriate to include for elections.

11. Because voters are intimidated by these machines, they might not question someone tampering with machine in polling place; whereas you can immediately tell if someone is accessing a paper ballot ballot box -- which ought not to happen until polls close.

Seems like the focus on the InkaVote Plus in the polling place removes focus on the observable security vulnerabilities that could possibly occur with the security of the paper ballots, thus causing inaccuracies in the 1% manual audit or if hcpb were to be implemented, that as well-- unused ballots may, for example, be filled out and slipped into the ballot box or exchanged for others on the sly - but if all focus is on the Inkavote plus, then normal observation checks and balances are not as effective.