STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECRETARY OF STATE OFFICE OF VOTING SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

PUBLIC HEARING ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF
CERTIFICATION AND CONDITIONAL APPROVAL OF VOTING SYSTEMS
NOT TESTED AND CERTIFIED TO CVSS

CALIFORNIA STATE CAPITOL BUILDING
ROOM 3191
1315 10TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CA

TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 2019

1:00 P.M.

Reported by: Peter Petty

APPEARANCES

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PUBLIC COMMENT:

Dean Logan, Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk
Bill O'Neill, El Dorado County Registrar of Voters
Kim Alexander, California Voter Foundation

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PROCEEDINGS

1:04 p.m.

SECRETARY PADILLA: Good afternoon, everybody. The time is now 1:04 p.m. Today is March 19th, 2019 and we are in the California State Capitol, Room 3191. I want to just call this hearing to order. Let's go ahead and begin.

The topic or subject matter of this hearing is the recent withdrawal of certification of older voting systems in the State of California. My name is Alex Padilla, proud to serve as your California Secretary of State.

Before I go into some opening remarks, and after which we'll certainly invite public comment and testimony, one quick housekeeping item. If we find the need to, there are some speaker cards available for you to fill out and submit to the staff, so we can make sure that you're afforded an opportunity to provide oral comments. Anyone wishing to submit written comments whether you're here today or catching us -- are we streaming? -- of just hearing about our hearing, you can email written comment at any time to votingsystems@sos.ca.gov. But please do so by 5:00 p.m. on March 28th, 2019.

With that let me thank those of you who are in the audience today. I want to recognize both Bill O'Neill and Dean Logan, Registrars from 2 of our 58 California

counties in the audience today. I hope to hear from you in just a few minutes.

But let me start by setting the stage here.

Election modernization has been a priority for me since

even prior to my election as Secretary of State. Some of

you may recall that while I was serving in the State Senate

I authored Senate Bill 360, which took effect on January

1st, 2014 and put California out front in pursuing expanded

options for modernizing voting systems, while preserving

and codifying some of the highest standards for security,

testing and certification in the country.

Among other things, Senate Bill 360 allowed county election officials to develop, own and operate public voting systems, subject of course to the approval and certification of the Secretary of State. This is what has empowered Los Angeles County to bring their VSAP project to the point where it is today.

Senate Bill 360 also required the Secretary of
State to adopt and publish voting system standards and
regulations that meet or exceed the Voluntary Voting System
Guidelines set forth by the United States Elections
Assistance Commission. And Senate Bill 360 called for
modern techniques known as risk-limiting audits to verify
the accuracy of voting technology.

But as Secretary of State, I'm also proud to have

sponsored legislation that brought reforms such as automatic voter registration to California, a new way of administering elections known as the Voter's Choice Act. And together we've advocated for state funding for voting system upgrades and replacements.

Now, the age of our voting systems have been a concern for some time. And in fact, pose one of the gravest threats to the integrity of our elections. Going back to 2014, President Obama's Commission on Election Administration issued a report that included this passage. "Perhaps the direst warning the Commission heard in its investigation concerned the impending crisis in voting technology. Well known to election administrators if not the public at large, this impending crisis arises from the widespread wearing out of voting machines purchased a decade ago."

In early 2016, I authored a joint op-ed with Orange County Registrar of Voters, Neal Kelly, making the case for funding to modernize California voting systems. It took a few years of continued advocacy in partnership with the California Association of Clerks and Election Officials, I might add, but we were finally successful in securing \$134 million in this year's state budget to upgrade or replace aging voting systems. This budget allocation was essential and timely to say the least.

And just last month, in a hearing of the U.S.

House of Representatives' Committee on Homeland Security,

Department of Homeland Security Director Christopher Krebs

testified. And again I'll quote, "It will take significant

and continual investment to ensure that election systems

across the nation are upgraded and secure, with vulnerable

systems retired. These efforts require a whole of

government approach."

As you all know voting systems in the majority of California counties are at or near their life expectancy. Many counties have voting machines that are in need of replacement parts that are no longer manufactured. Some counties have equipment that utilize operating systems that are so old their vendors no longer provide tech support, meaning they cannot be patched or updated with the latest security software.

In September of 2015, the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU issued a report entitled "America's Voting Machines at Risk," which raised a number of concerns including the failure of equipment to work as intended, and the difficulty of finding replacement parts for machines that are no longer manufactured.

And finally, in 2016, a report by the California Legislative Analyst's Office underscored this point and recommended that the Legislature consider one-time funding

to replace aging voting systems. Specifically the LAO wrote, "In one example a county system had a failed part that is no longer supported by the manufacturer or easy to replace. The county purchased a replacement part through eBay."

So to address this, I have exercised my authority as California's Chief Elections Officer to help accelerate the process for ensuring that all California's voting systems meet the California Voting System Standards requirements. We can't afford to rely on outdated systems, crossing our fingers and hoping for the best.

As such, a few weeks ago, I initiated a process for withdrawing the Certification or the Conditional Approval of voting systems that were previously granted if they have not been tested and certified to the current California Voting Systems Standards.

Many California counties are already well on their way towards adopting new CVSS-compliant systems. In fact 20 counties have already implemented such systems with others in the procurement process. For reference there are currently three voting systems which have been tested and certified to the new standards: Number one, Dominion Voting, Inc. Democracy Suite 5.2 Voting System; the County of Los Angeles's Voting Solutions for All People Tally 1.0 System; and HART InterCivic's Verity voting 3.0.1 Voting

System.

In addition, there are three more voting systems currently being tested and reviewed to the California

Voting Systems Standards. They are Dominion Voting Systems

Democracy Suite 5.10. The County of Los Angeles' Voting

Solutions for All People Tally Version 2.0 and Election

Systems and Software's EVS 6.0.4.2

The withdrawal of certification or a conditional approval is effective August 27th, 2019. Pursuant to Elections Code Section 19232 however, any election conducted six months from that August 27th date shall not be affected by this action. Therefore, any federal, state, county, municipal, district or school election conducted from August 27th through February 27th of 2020, may continue to use voting systems previously certified or approved even if it has not been tested and certified to the Voting System Standards.

I recognize the work and challenges with implementing a new voting system. And I want to ensure that counties move to a CVSS certified system. There may be unique circumstances that could impede a jurisdiction from procuring and implementing a CVSS certified system by February 27th of 2020, including such things as delays in the procurement process or county funding. Therefore, for any election conducted after February 27th, 2020, in which

a county believes they need to use a decertified system, a written Request for a Conditional Approval for an Extension of Use will be considered by my office, but must be submitted by April 5th, 2019.

Requests must be submitted in writing and include the following: 1) The jurisdiction's justification for a Conditional Approval for Extension of Use; and 2) the jurisdiction's plan and schedule for implementing a CVSS certified voting system including detailed procurement and staff training schedules as well as a specific final implementation date.

Finally, while not required, I have convened this public hearing to allow interested parties to comment on this action. California has been a leader in the area of voting systems for many years, but we have come to appreciate that the threats to our democracy from nefarious actors, both foreign and domestic, will continue. And that is what causes us to take this action today.

I will now turn it over to Susan Lapsley to provide a brief. history of these legacy voting systems Susan?

MS. LAPSLEY: Great, thank you. For those who may remember, back in 2002 the Help America Vote Act was passed and signed into law by Congress, and the President at the time, in response to hanging chads and butterfly

ballots in Florida. At the time there was federal money that was appropriated to all 50 states and California received a large portion of that. But with the money came also requirements and responsibilities.

With that money states were required to make sure that all voting systems had a voter verified paper audit trail. They had to do away with punch card or lever voting. They had to ensure that voting systems were accessible for those with specific needs for voting. And so California began on that journey of modernizing its voting systems.

California at the same time also passed the Shelley-Hertzberg Voting Modernization Bond Act of 2002, which provided additional money to counties at the time to upgrade their systems. It went hand in hand with the requirements of the -- the benefit of the money was a requirement that counties implement by the election in 2006. At the time, the U.S. Department of Justice was threatening litigation against many of California counties to comply with the requirements of HAVA. And so counties moved forward with meeting the requirements of HAVA and upgrading their systems and replacing those punch card and lever systems as well as providing accessible alternatives for those with specific needs in voting.

The downside of that was that the equipment that

they had available to buy was based upon technology that was, at the time just 20 years old, and over 20 years old for some of the jurisdictions. So in that rush to get HAVA compliant systems and use their HAVA money and not be sued by the federal government, the counties made the purchases and implemented these systems.

Soon thereafter in 2007, the previous Secretary of State commissioned a special report by scientists at UC Berkeley to investigate the systems and they performed a top to bottom review of several systems. At the time it was the Diebold GEMS 1.18.24 AccuVote TSX System, the HART InterCivic System 6.2.1 System, the Sequoia WinEDS Version 3.1.012 and ES&S InkaVote Plus Precinct Ballot Counter Voting System Version 2.1.

Soon after conducting the top-to-bottom review, they identified some security vulnerabilities. They decertified those systems and then reapproved and recertified those systems with additional security requirements and mitigations around those systems.

After that the California Secretary of State moved forward in implementing through the requirements of SB 360. There was a requirement that the Secretary of State develop Voting Systems Standards, that it removed certification from being required to go to the Federal Election Assistance Commission, and allowed the state to do

certification without that certification happening. So in doing that the California Secretary of State's voting system standards had to meet or exceed the federal standards.

So in 2014, the as the Secretary mentioned, the California Voting Systems Standards were developed at the time and currently they are the most advanced and modern voting system standards. They take -- they have open-ended vulnerability testing, there's penetration testing.

There's a wide variety of requirements that are in those that aren't in any other testing standards.

And as the Secretary mentioned, after 2014 more and more reports and investigations began happening around voting systems. As he mentioned, the 2014 President's Commission on Election Administration mentioned not only how outdated these systems were, but how parts were unavailable and their lack of security. Their 2015 Brennen Center Report did the same as did the 2016 Legislative Analyst's Office here in California.

So that brings us to the point of, as the Secretary mentioned, the systems are old. They are based on old technology. The can no longer be patched. They can no longer receive parts. They are no longer supported by their vendors. There's a litany of issues around them and California's counties have done a phenomenal job of

maintaining those systems and keeping them running securely and safely given the lack of patches and other support around them. So that's what brings us here today.

SECRETARY PADILLA: Great. Thank you, Susan.

So now that the stage has been set, anybody who wishes to offer public comment is welcome to come forward at this time. I see -- I mentioned two of our Registrars of Voters in the audience. If you'd like to come first, you're welcome.

MR. LOGAN: Good afternoon. I'm Dean Logan. I'm the Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk for Los Angeles County. Thank you for the opportunity to be here. And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your continued support for the modernization of voting systems in California. It's been a long road and I remember working collaboratively with your Senate Office on SB 360 and that laid the foundation for the work that we're doing in LA County on the Voting Solutions for All People Initiative. So it's actually pretty exciting to be where we are today since that's been over a decade in the making.

So I'm pleased to be here today just to put on the record, our belief that this action is a positive and solid policy position grounded in recognizing the critical need for secure, usable and modern voting equipment. And as you referenced, both of you in your earlier comments, I

think it's fair to say that the nature of the environment in which we operate in elections actually necessitates this action.

As I said in Los Angeles County we initiated a little over a decade ago the Voting Solutions for All People Initiative. And we did that -- at the time we did that, because there was no other viable option for Los Angeles County. We already had a legacy voting system that was at the end of its life cycle and there was no available system on the market, certified or not certified, that could meet the needs of LA County in terms of capacity and in terms of offering a new and improved voting experience for our electorate.

So we are pleased that through that work we now have, and as you referenced, we're excited to see that our system was one of those listed as meeting the standards. And we have an application pending for the full solution that will roll out in March of 2020. So we're pleased to be at that point, pleased to have something that does meet the capacity, but also to be opening the doors towards open technology solutions in California that don't rely on the kind of traditional proprietary vendors that have been the exclusive market for voting systems in California.

So with that I would also say that I think it's important to note that this action today is not about

counties dragging their feet or their lagging interest in doing so. And indeed I think many of the counties, especially those who have the kind of equipment that you referenced in your opening remarks, very much would like to have new voting systems in place. Rather it's a consequence of a limited and largely closed market, a history of regulatory instability, and an inadequate funding base. So the good news is we've worked hard here in California to address all of those things.

And this action is an important step, but it's not a last step. We still need to expand the market.

There needs to be more options for counties in California.

We need to have voting systems that are designed for further development, because voter behavior and voter needs are changing a rapid basis. And again we need more options for counties.

So key considerations going forward, and I think that this is an alignment with your office, is to push for continued funding. The funding last year in the state budget certainly was an important first step and certainly supports the actions being taken that's being discussed today. But it's not adequate to fully replace the voting systems that are needed in California.

With regard to open technology and solutions such as the Voting Solutions for All People Project in LA

County, and the work that's being done down in San Francisco on open source voting solutions, we need to develop a protocol or a governance structure that allows for the sharing of those systems. And but that does that in a way that also preserves the security of those systems going forward. And we're looking forward to working together on that.

In LA County, we also believe very strongly that advancing publicly owned voting systems is a critical component.

And finally just the continued partnership around security issues, the work with Department of Homeland Security, with other security and IT professionals here in the state, is critical to the success. Because the systems themselves won't do that as you and I have discussed on multiple occasions. Security for voting is not a destination, it's an ongoing activity, and that requires a lot of partnership and a lot of collaboration.

So again appreciate the work that you and your staff have put into this, and the great partnership in moving us forward. And look forward to being back in front of you for the certification of the full VSAP Solution later this year.

SECRETARY PADILLA: Thank you, Dean.

Bill?

MR. O'NEILL: Mr. Secretary and --

SECRETARY PADILLA: Let's push that button in front of you.

MR. O'NEILL: Thank you. Now I know if it's red it's good.

Mr. Secretary and members of your staff which I've got to compliment, you have just phenomenal staff.

I've worked with each of the people up here and they're just terrific to work with. I came from the vendor side, so I worked with NaKesha and Todd quite a bit and I really appreciate the support I've always gotten from them.

I really appreciate the opportunity to speak here. And I want to compliment you on your dedication. I've noticed since you came on board as Secretary your movement towards technology and improving technology and voting systems, as well as administration of elections, has been really beneficial. I've seen it from the vendor side and now from the county side how great that's been. So I really appreciate that.

I'm the Registrar, Bill O'Neill, Registrar of
Voters for El Dorado County. The decertification caught us
a little bit off guard although we were already looking at
a voting system, because we really share your concern about
the problems and the age of the system. So we actually
have our first Voting System Selection Committee on

Thursday. And of many of the things that I'm telling them about the system, and why we're replacing it, are the same things that you and your staff have said today. The aged technology, the lack of equipment that's available. We can't get upgrades. There's lots of things that concern us about the system.

With that said, we were going to go out to RFP. With the decertification what we've changed to is no longer going out to RFP, but looking for counties that we can piggy back on. We figure that will save us about four weeks in the selection process, which would be very beneficial because there's now over 30 counties looking to replace, and we don't want to end up being County 34 looking for equipment and support. That is a big concern. How will the vendors respond to this and how will the vendors continue to provide good support and enough staffing? So that is a big concern that we have as a county, so we're trying to get further up in line by doing it this way.

We always had, as a failsafe, using our current system for 2020 in the event that we couldn't afford a new system; the county couldn't do the matching of the 757,000 that we got through AB 24; in the event that out of the three systems the Selection Committee didn't think any of them fit our county's profile.

We are also concerned about running out of time. Implementing in my opinion after October could be extremely difficult if not disastrous for the Presidential. So my goal with the vendors was implement and train by August 29th of this year to make sure that we didn't run the risk and then potentially use it for our November election cycle. But that's going to be up to the vendors, and what kind of equipment they have, and staffing that they can help us with.

And the other thing that we're looking at is vote centers. That's been a big focus of our county since I came on board. Moving forward with vote centers is really critical, I think to serve voters. Now our county, we've been meeting with a lot of folks. We've gotten positive feedback, but I haven't gone to the Board yet on doing that, because we want to make sure we vet it really well with our voters first. But I think it's a great way and I appreciate you pushing through SB 450, yeah because I think it's a terrific way to serve our voters better.

We, currently because we need to save time, and because we're trying to cut this time out of it and save as much as we can, it's obviously put a lot of pressure on us. And a couple of things that have come up that is unique to our county and a few other counties, we've got the Senate District 1 election that's coming up. That's going to be a

countywide election for us and it's going to cost us about a quarter million dollars. Then it's unlikely with six people on the ballot that that will be settled in the primary, so we'll probably go to a runoff. That's another \$250,000. If one of the Assembly Members is selected that will then be another county election, not the full county, but about 30 percent. So we figure about another 125,000 for that election. If it's not settled in the primary then it goes to a runoff. That's another 125,000. You add all that up and that's \$750,000 worth of elections we have to run this year.

That's huge concern, because that was -- we were given 757,000 with a one-to-one match. And now we might spend 750,000 on special elections. I've got to go to my Board and my CAO made a joke the other day, "Well Bill, you've come on board and suddenly we're \$1.5 million over budget in your department." While that's kind of funny for us to joke about internally, it really hurts a county like ours.

There's such a contrast between -- you've got in LA County which is the largest county in the state and the nation -- and then you've got El Dorado, which we're a fairly small county, but not the smallest. And I know it's just going to be difficult for us to do that match after spending potentially \$750,000 on running these elections.

So what we're looking at is how can we come up with the funding?

We've also had this phenomenal winter as everybody knows. It's been fantastic. Lots of rain.

Great snow. But that's also been somewhat devastating to our county in that there's a lot of trees falling. There's roads that have been damaged. There's other serious issues with our snow plows just broke down, because they've been overused with this winter. That's another drain on our county. So finding the additional funding to help us with this would be really critical.

We really, as I mentioned, are looking at seriously at SB 450. I think it'd be a great move for our county. Some of the voters I've talked to also feel that way. But I don't think there's any way we can move to SB 450 and do a voting system. It may end up being a pick one or the other. I'm not sure because the pricing difference is so different between a vote center purchase and a polling place purchase.

There's some things in SB 450 that are required, the outreach being the biggest component. There's no funding available for outreach right now. We're estimating between \$150,000 and \$200,000 for outreach, because we've got to touch each voter twice before each election. We have to do radio, newspaper, TV ads, those types of things.

All great things to do, will serve the voters well. The county was going to have to pay that out of pocket of course and now we have to replace the voting system as well. It's all just concerning from a fiscal standpoint as Dean had also mentioned.

So we're just looking at this as it's a move that we wanted to make. It's a move we were moving towards. But with the special elections and other things coming up we just kind of always had in our back pocket that we could failsafe to our existing system. I understand your decision and need to move back, but we could really use some funding help. Especially if we're going to move towards 450 and we have to make this match with 1824.

So thank you very much. I do appreciate your time.

SECRETARY PADILLA: Okay. Thank you.

And so you saw me jotting down some notes. I'll reply to some of the questions and issues you raised, but after we've heard from all the speakers today.

MR. O'NEILL: Great. Thank you.

SECRETARY PADILLA: Good afternoon.

MS. ALEXANDER: Good afternoon. Hi. I'm Kim
Alexander with the California Voter Foundation and I'm
happy to be here today. Thanks for convening this hearing.
I want to share a couple of remarks, and also let you know

that the Verified Voting Foundation shares these remarks as well, and will be sending in some written testimony for you.

The California Voter Foundation welcomes

Secretary of State Alex Padilla's decision to decertify

voting systems that do not meet the 2015 California Voting

System Standards. California has long required voter

verified paper ballots and post-election audits. And has

been at the forefront of election security for many years.

This decision ensures our state continues its strong track

record of proving voters with a high degree of confidence

and the reliability and accuracy of our election outcomes.

Voter confidence is the cornerstone of free and fair elections. We know it will be challenging for all 58 counties to transition to a new voting system in time for the March 2020 Presidential Primary. And understand there may be as many as 22 counties that will seek an extension to continue using legacy systems in 2020. This challenge is compounded by the fact, as I stated earlier, that there are few choices on the market currently that meet the stronger standards from which counties can choose.

We don't want counties to rush this decision to acquire new voting systems. As was mentioned earlier, this happened the last time around when we replaced punch card voting machines. And we ended up with tens of thousands of

paperless electronic voting machines used by many counties that produced results, which could not be verified and were later retrofitted or replaced with paper based systems.

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While we don't want counties to rush, we are also concerned that voters in those exception jurisdictions may be wondering if their ballots are secure. Given that some number of counties will be using legacy systems in 2020, the California Voter Foundation recommends that the Secretary of State and legislative leaders mitigate this risk by requiring these counties to take extra steps to secure their election process such as participating in the Secretary of State's Department of Election Cyber Security. And the Department of Homeland Security's Critical Infrastructure Protection Services such as system penetration testing, staff email and security training, and security drills, public reporting of the results of postelection audits that can be easily located online, so that voters can easily learn how their county's election results were verified.

Such steps would likely require additional staffing and access to technology experts that may not be available locally in some counties. And somehow the state needs to help counties access the talent and expertise they need to secure our votes.

We are appreciative of the careful work the

Secretary of State's office and the people here on this panel, are conducting to certify new voting systems to the new rigorous standards. As well as your agency's establishment of the Department of Election Cyber Security and the Legislature's support for creating it, as well as the Secretary of State and Legislature support for funding in last year's state budget to help counties acquire new voting systems.

But we also need to get out of this crisis funding mode for elections. Election equipment and election administration are fundamental government resources and services that must be supported by the state on an ongoing basis, not just one-time responses to crisis.

Election funding can, and should be used, as an incentive to help improve all counties' election security practices and performance. And provide increased state oversight and guidance in equipment procurement, secure balloting procedures, and post-election audits.

Additional state government agencies such as the Bureau of State Audits or the State Controller's Office could be beneficial in providing some assistance and oversight to counties and help ensure investments in election infrastructure are sound.

Another area where California can, and should provide more leadership, is in the open source election

system movement. We need to stop fighting the last battle and look ahead and be prepared for the future providing an alternative model for acquiring voting systems that is not dependent on private companies and proprietary software, could serve to make secure voting technology more affordable and more reliable.

Fortunately, several efforts to develop a new voting system model are underway from the Los Angeles County Voting Systems for All People Project to San Francisco's Open Source Voting Initiative to the new Department of Defense DARPA Project just announced last week to develop an open source voting platform. And the relatively new nonprofit business startup VotingWorks, based in Redwood City, and the OSET Institute also based in California.

San Francisco and other counties' open source efforts could benefit from a state investment, which advocates sought in last year's budget, but were not successful. The California Voter Foundation urges our state's leaders to build support for election administration, election funding, and open source election research and development into the state budget on an ongoing basis. So that counties can provide all voters they serve with a high degree of confidence in the reliability of election outcomes, not just from election to

election, but from generation to generation. Thank you.

SECRETARY PADILLA: Thank you, Kim.

Anyone else wishing to offer comments? Going once, going twice.

I'll thank you all for your patience, and for those of you who did testify, this has been helpful. And above all, help affirm that the actions that we're taking, is the right step at the right time.

Just a couple of comments back at some of what was offered, by those who did testify. What I related to the subject matter for today, did I hear El Dorado may be the next Voter Choice Act County?

MR. O'NEILL: We're hoping.

SECRETARY PADILLA: As with this transition to newer voting systems, you know, restating our commitment to work with you in complete partnership should you choose to take that step. Because we do think it has served five counties well last cycle and more going forward. Some of the concern -- not in a heavy way, but it was raised that look, it's a finite time period here. We're less than a year from next year's Primary Election.

And so again to reiterate that my office stands ready in partnership, all aspects of our agency, to work with counties to make sure that the plans are not just expeditious, but that they're thorough and responsible and

ultimately successful in implementing new voting systems.

I heard a comment about funding. And the need to have consistent and sustainable funding sources. And I couldn't agree more. Elections and election infrastructure, and especially the security of our elections, is something that cannot just happen once every 15 years. As we've come to learn especially since 2016, the threats to our elections, those seeking to undermine our democracy, are at it on a daily basis if not more often than that. I believe the threats to our elections will continue to increase not just in frequency, but in sophistication. And so therefore our defenses have to more than keep up with as well. And so there needs to be ongoing sustained support for elections, yes at the state, but especially at the local level by all of the government: federal state and local.

I appreciate acknowledgement of the standards.

Just as we're seeking sustained funding for elections, it's not just to put in place what may be the best of the best in the year 2019 or 2020. As technology continues to improve and innovate, and the threats against us continue to increase in sophistication, so do our constant standards, excuse me, so do our standards need to constantly be revisited and improved upon over time.

And last but not least, I heard a couple of you

mention open source as a potential solution or consideration in this mix. I couldn't agree more. That's why through Senate Bill 360 we opened the door for potential open source voting systems to be utilized in California. To date there has not been a complete open source system brought forward for testing and certification. The \$134 million in the current fiscal year budget does allow counties to utilize some of that funding for an open source system again, once one is tested and certified for use in California or even for the R&D of an open source system.

So I couldn't agree more that that's a potential solution in whole or in part. But because there's a lot of conversations around this and a lot of interest about open source across the State of California, the recognition that we await the system to come forward for testing and certification aside from what Los Angeles County has already done through their tally system.

And last but not least, just it was not lost upon us at the announcement of this last week, Department of Defense, DARPA, moving forward with their project. So we're already in communication with our federal partners to learn more not just about the substance of that project, but the timeframe for that project and when there can be actionable lessons learned from their pilot.

So Team SOS, is there anything I'm missing or overlooking here that we should share for the record? If not thank you all very much for coming. Just as a reminder for those who were unable to be with us today or those of you who might have been shy about coming forward, you can still submit comments in writing by emailing it to voting systems@sos.ca.gov. And we ask that you do so by 5:00 p.m. on March 28th, 2019. Thank you all very much. (Whereupon, the Public Hearing was adjourned at 1:43 p.m.) --000--

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

the foregoing hearing was taken at the time and place therein stated; that the testimony of said witnesses were reported by me, a certified electronic court reporter and a disinterested person, and was under my supervision thereafter transcribed into typewriting.

I do hereby certify that the testimony in

And I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for either or any of the parties to said hearing nor in any way interested in the outcome of the cause named in said caption.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 14th day of May, 2019.

PETER PETTY CER**D-493 Notary Public

TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE

I do hereby certify that the testimony in the foregoing hearing was taken at the time and place therein stated; that the testimony of said witnesses were transcribed by me, a certified transcriber.

And I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for either or any of the parties to said hearing nor in any way interested in the outcome of the cause named in said caption.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 14th day of May, 2019.

Jill Jacoby

Jell Jacoby

Certified Transcriber AAERT No. CERT**D-633