

5

Canvass Activities Summary

June 8, 2010 Statewide Direct Primary Election

Auditing of the Precincts

Each Inspector is responsible to complete a variety of forms and certifications after the close of the polls on Election Day. Elections staff then audits those forms to account for all ballots issued and returned. On June 8, 2010, there were 133 precinct boards at 84 polling places: 30 were doubles, 6 were triples, and 4 were quadruples. All precincts were audited and where the paperwork reflected discrepancies, those discrepancies were thoroughly researched and resolved. In all cases these were poll worker errors such as simple mathematical errors, transcription errors, or recording information in multiple places on the same form (i.e. counting a spoiled surrendered vote-by-mail ballot as both a spoiled ballot and a surrendered vote-by-mail ballot therefore recording it as two ballots when only one existed).

1% Manual Tally

Per Elections Code Section 15360, 1% of precincts must be hand tallied to determine that the voting system is reading and tabulating votes correctly. For June 8, 2010 there were 160 voting precincts, which meant that only 1.6 or 2 precincts needed to be counted. Santa Cruz County has a policy of tallying a precinct from each of the 5 supervisorial districts, so 5 precincts were selected.

Precincts were randomly selected on Thursday, June 10th at 10:30 a.m. by staff. All precincts are randomly selected by pulling a precinct number from a hat. The first 2 precincts selected were deemed "full count" precincts, where all contests on the ballot would be tallied. Then other precincts were pulled in order to capture all contests. All votes cast in those precincts were tallied including Vote-By-Mail, Precinct Ballots, and votes cast on Touchscreens. The Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) was left intact and read using a reel-to-reel mechanism. Blank ballots that were encountered (in any media) were tallied as undervotes for each contest. Spoiled, cancelled and otherwise invalidated ballots (such as voided ballots on the VVPAT) were not tallied as they are not valid ballots.

Vote-by-mail and paper ballots used at the polling places were tallied by audit teams of 4 or 5 auditors. All auditors were grouped around a large table. The ballots were distributed between all the auditors. Each auditor had a random selection of the ballots. First, the ballots were counted for the total number in the pile. This allowed the auditor to balance the number of votes cast (including under and overvotes) with the number of ballots in their pile. Next, one staff person was the caller. They would call the contest to be counted and go around the table asking each of the auditors for the number of ballots that they had for a given choice. Each auditor had to balance the number of votes cast to their number of ballots and the total of the votes cast for all the auditors had to match the tally being taken. The tally is kept by the caller who also tabulated using a calculator. The results were later compared to the central tally count and if the totals did not match, then the hand tally began again.

Touchscreen votes were audited by reviewing the VVPAT records. VVPAT records were audited by teams of four. One person was assigned as the reader, another person as the verifier, and the other two as tally-takers. The tally-takers kept independent tallies. The tally-takers had to match one another at random check points and at the end of the tape, they had to match one another and the results tape. Those results were then compared against the central count. If the results did not match, then the hand tally began again.

Materials used to complete the tallies were minimal, but included specialized tally sheets, reel-to-reel mechanisms, pencils, scotch tape, calculators and the central count reports.

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
Full Ballot		2008			5016
1st District Central Committee	1201				
3rd District County Supervisor			3153		
3rd District Central Committee			3153		
4th District County Supervisor				4026	

All contests balanced on the first pass, with the exceptions noted below:

- 2008
 - Precinct Ballots: Democratic Governor, Controller, and State Board of Equalization; Superior Court Judge (seat 3) and County Auditor-Controller did not balance on the first pass. They were recounted by hand again and balanced. 2nd District Democratic Central Committee did not balance on the first pass either. It was recounted by hand 3 more times and continued to obtain the same result – Church 7, Emard 10, Sorcenelli 10, Manning 8, De La Cruz 10, and 55 undervotes. This differed from the Statement of Vote which read: Church 8, Emard 11, Sorcenelli 10, Manning 8, De La Cruz 8, and 54 undervotes. The variance was noted.
 - Vote-By-Mail Ballots: Democratic Attorney General, and 2nd District Democratic Central Committee and Superior Court Judge (seat 3) did not balance on first pass. It was recounted by hand again and balanced
- 3153
 - Precinct Ballots: 3rd District County Supervisor did not balance on the first pass. It was recounted by hand again and balanced.
 - Vote-By-Mail Ballots: 3rd District Democratic Central Committee did not balance on first pass. It was recounted by hand 3 more times and continued to obtain the same result – Terrazas 24, Fuller 25, Malone 18, Darling 30, Murtha 22, Mathews 38, Schaller 17, Warner 24, and 228 undervotes. This differed from the Statement of Vote which read: Terrazas 23, Fuller 25, Malone 18, Darling 29, Murtha 21, Mathews 38, Schaller 17, Warner 24, and 228 undervotes. The variance was noted.
- 5016
 - Vote-By-Mail Ballots: Democratic Attorney General and US Representative (14th district); and County Clerk did not balance on the first pass. They were recounted by hand again and balanced. Democratic Lt. Governor, County

Assessor-Recorder, County Auditor-Controller, County District Attorney, County Sheriff-Coroner and County Treasurer-Tax Collector also did not balance on the first pass. They were recounted by hand 3 more times and continued to obtain the same result. For the Democratic Lt. Governor contest the results were: Hahn 10, Korevaar 11, Newsom 43, 1 write-in and 2 undervotes. This differed from the Statement of Vote which read: Hahn 10, Korevaar 11, Newsom 42, 1 write-in and 2 undervotes. The variance was noted. For the County Assessor-Recorder contest the results were: Saldavia 86 and 27 undervotes; while the Statement of Vote read Saldavia 85 and 28 undervotes. For the County Auditor-Controller contest the results were: Walker 83 and 30 undervotes; while the Statement of Vote read Walker 82 and 31 undervotes. For the County District Attorney contest the results were: Lee 84, 1 write-in and 28 undervotes; while the Statement of Vote read Lee 82, 1 write-in and 30 undervotes. For the County Sheriff-Coroner contest the results were: Wowak 84 and 29 undervotes; while the Statement of Vote read Wowak 83 and 30 undervotes. For the County Treasurer-Tax Collector contest the results were: Keeley 82, write-in 1 and 29 undervotes; while the Statement of Vote read Keely 81, write-in 1 and 31 undervotes. The variances were noted.

A few observers were present during the canvass, and we welcome observers at all times. Because the audit was conducted at central elections, no additional security measures were required above and beyond normal security precautions in place.

100% Manual Tally of Votes Cast on Touchscreens

In addition to the 1% manual tally mandated by state election code, the Secretary of State mandated that 100% of all votes cast on touchscreens must be hand tallied to confirm the electronic results. Santa Cruz County had 4696 qualified votes cast on touchscreens on Election Day, June 8, 2010.

In teams of four, each Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail was hand tallied. Duties were divided among team members with one member reading from the tape, one member verifying what was read, and the other two members keeping independent, simultaneous tallies. Periodically throughout the tape, team members would pause and compare results to ensure that the tally-takers were in sync. If they were not, they would go back to the last balance point, noted with X marks on the tally sheet and post-it notes on the tape, and begin the tally over. Once all the ballots for that machine had been read, then the totals on the tally sheets were compared against the results portion of the tape. The tallies must match. The supervisor for the 100% tally or other designated staff would then compare the tally sheets (which already balanced with the machine results printed at the polls on Election Day) to the central tally counts. This verified that the central county system was accurate reading and recording the votes from each unit. During this process, the votes from the tally sheets for the central and satellite touchscreens were added to the tally results for each corresponding precinct.

For Precinct 2030, we recounted the votes from the machine report instead of the voter verified paper audit trail due to a printer jam that made the votes unreadable.