

Canvass Activities Summary

June 3, 2008 Direct Statewide Primary Election

Auditing of the Precincts

Each Inspector is responsible to complete a variety of forms and certifications after the close of the polls on Election Day. Elections staff then audits those forms to account for all ballots issued and returned. In June 2008, there were 361 precinct boards at 361 polling places. All precincts were audited and where the paperwork reflected discrepancies, those discrepancies were thoroughly researched and resolved. In all cases these were poll worker errors such as simple mathematical errors, transcription errors, or recording information in multiple places on the same form (i.e. counting a spoiled surrendered vote-by-mail ballot as both a spoiled ballot and a surrendered vote-by-mail ballot therefore recording it as two ballots when only one existed).

1% Manual Tally

Per Elections Code Section 15360, 1% of precincts must be hand tallied to determine that the voting system is reading and tabulating votes correctly. For June 2008, 5 precincts were fully tallied, 5 additional precincts had specific contests tallied that were not included in the initial group of precincts, these contests were also tallied.

Precincts were randomly selected using a random selection computer program. Five precincts were fully tallied. All votes cast in those precincts were tallied including Vote-By-Mail, Precinct Ballots, and votes cast on Touchscreens. Blank ballots that were encountered (in any media) were tallied as undervotes for each contest. Spoiled, cancelled and otherwise invalidated ballots (such as voided ballots on the VVPAT) were not tallied as they are not valid ballots.

Vote-by-mail and paper ballots used at the polling places were tallied by audit teams of 4 auditors, and one supervisor. All auditors were grouped around a large table. The ballots were distributed between all the auditors. Each auditor had to balance the number of votes cast to their number of ballots. The tally is kept by a team of two tally-keepers. Both the tally-keepers and the caller had to match and the total had to balance. The results were later compared to the central tally count and if the totals did not match, then the hand tally began again.

Touchscreen votes were audited by reviewing the VVPAT records. VVPAT records were audited by teams of four. One person was assigned as the reader, another person as the verifier, and the other two as tally-takers. The tally-takers kept independent tallies. The tally-takers had to match one another at the end of the tape, they had to match one another and the results tape. Those results were then compared against the central count. If the results did not match, then the hand tally began again.

Materials used to complete the tallies were minimal, but included specialized tally sheets, pencils, calculators and the central count reports.

In conclusion, our hand tallies matched the machine output totals with 100% accuracy.

Seals Audit

Each piece of voting equipment is protected under many levels of security. One level of that security is the visible seals used on the equipment both permanently and on Election Day. All visible seals were audited. Where questions arose regarding particular seals, extensive investigations were undertaken. In no case was there any break of security that endangered any votes. All instances of anomalies were traced back to poll worker or staff error such as typographical errors or not returning all the broken seals.

Equipment Incidents

Election Day went very well in Ventura County. 6 incidents were logged for voting equipment. Operator error incidents were omitted. Of the 6 incidents, 0 incident occurred on card activators, 5 incidents were in relation to scanners, and the remaining 1 incidents involved a printer for a touch screen.